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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

MACK FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NEVADA MOTOR RENTALS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13603

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
By its complaint, filed June 11,1970, (R. 240), Plaintiff seeks to recover from Defendants the sum of $127,603.05, together with interest and attorney's fees which
Plaintiff then claimed was the balance due and owing
on seven Mack Cabs and Chassis which had originally
been sold under contract to Nevada Motor Rentals by
Plaintiff's assignor, Mack Trucks, Inc., the purchase price
of which had been guaranteed by W. J. Digby, individually.
The complaint as filed also named Scott Trucking
and Lee Scott of Boise, Idaho, as other defendants on the
basis that the seven trucks in question had been sold by
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Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. to Scott Trucking under a
transfer agreement, with Lee Scott inidividually guaranteeing on behalf of Scott Trucking. Service of Summons
on Scott was quashed by Court Order for lack of jurisdiction over Scott.
Both Defendants, W. J. Digby and Nevada Motor
Rentals denied that this Court had jurisdiction over them.
Such issue was previously raised in this court by a motion to quash the Service of Summons upon said Defendants (R. 271 through 303) which motion was denied by
Judge Stewart M. Hanson on November 24, 1970, although granted as to Lee Scott dba Scott Trucking.
Defendants then moved the Court to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party (Lee Scott, dba
Scott Trucking). This motion was denied by Judge
Aldon J. Anderson on January 6, 1971 (R. 303). Thereafter, both Defendants (Nevada Motor Rentals and W. J.
Digby, Inc.) filed their answer and counterclaim on
January 22, 1971.
Defendant Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. by its answer admitted allegations of the complaint relating to the
sale, but denied any liability to plaintiff thereunder, and
by way of affirmative defense and counterclaim alleged
plaintiff had negligently failed to dispose of the seven
trucks and that as a result thereof, said defendant was
damaged by the amount of any deficiency and would be
entitled to a judgment on its counterclaim as an offset
against any deficiency and in an amount no less than any
deficiency (R. 305 through R. 310).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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W. J. Digby by his answer and counterclaim made
similar allegations and then by way of an amended answer and counterclaim asserted that the transactions in
question were all covered by the Uniform Commercial
Code then in effect in Arizona, Colorado and Nebraska,
that no notice of sale was given to Digby, that such sales
were not made in a reasonably commercial manner as
required by the code, and that Digby was entitled to a
judgment on his counterclaim in an amount equal to the
difference between the amount owed on the contracts by
Nevada Motor Rentals and the net proceeds received
upon the ultimate sale of the trucks in 1972 (R. 311
through R. 315).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In the course of getting the case at issue, the question of jurisdiction was raised and an interim appeal
filed with the Supreme Court, at which time the Supreme
Court declined to hear the issue of jurisdiction over
Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. and W. J. Digby.
After extensive discovery, the case was tried on the
16th day of April, 1973, before the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft, one of the judges of the Third Judicial District
Court. Following the trial, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and a Judgment Decree were entered in favor
of the Plaintiff. From this judgment, the Defendant
appeals (R. 688 through R. 695).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Nevada Motor Rentals seeks the following relief on appeal.
1. A determination that the Court had no jurisdiction over Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., or that the Court
did have jurisdiction over Lee Scott dba Scott Trucking.
2. The Court having determined that the method
of disposition of the secured trucks by the Plaintiff, Mack
Financial, was not made in a commercially reasonable
manner, no deficiency can be assessed and the case should
be dismissed.
3. The Plaintiff gave no notice of sale to the Defendants for which reason no deficiency may be charged
against Defendants and the case should be ordered dismissed.
4. In the event a deficiency judgment is allowed:
(a) The Defendant should have full credit of
$16,000 for each 1968 vehicle and $15,000 for the
1967 vehicle, the price at which each could have been
sold had the Plaintiff allowed their sale in a timely
manner, and
(b) No interest should be allowed the Plaintiff
on the credits which should have been given at date
of timely sale.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mack Trucks, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, at

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
all times material hereto owned all of the outstanding
shares of stock of Mack Financial Corporation which thus
is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mack Trucks, Inc. (R. 30).
The purpose of Mack Financial is to provide financing,
when desired, to customers purchasing trucks from Mack
Trucks, Inc. Mack Financial Corporation has no authority or supervisory powers over the activities performed
by a Mack Truck outlet, and while not a Utah corporation, is authorized to and does business within the State
of Utah and operates an office at 2525 South Main, Salt
Lake City, Utah (R. 9, R. 124, R. 125).
2. Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. is a foreign corporation whose outstanding stock is entirely owned by defendant W. J. Digby and his wife (R. 77). The business
consists of renting or leasing trucks, tractors and trailers
and is conducted out of W. J. Digby's home in Scottsdale,
Arizona. Its truck equipment is rented principally to
Digby Truck Line, a corporation owned by James Digby
and Latisha Carston, son and daughter of W. J. Digby.
W. J. Digby has not owned stock in Digby Truck Line
since 1959. Both James Digby and Donald Digby, another son of W. J. Digby, hold the office of Vice President
in Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. (R. 78, R. 133).
3. On August 31, 1967, a conditional sales agreement was executed between Mack Trucks, Inc. of Denver, Colorado, as vendor, and Nevada Motor Rentals of
Omaha, Nebraska, as vendee, whereby it was agreed that
the vendor sold to said vendee three Mack cabs and
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chassis in accordance with the terms and conditions
therein stated, including chassis No. 1974 (Exhibit 1 P ) .
4. On January 23, 1968, a second conditional sales
agreement was executed between the said parties by
which Mack Trucks, Inc. sold to Nevada Motor Rentals
nine new Mack cabs and chassis in accordance with the
terms and conditions therein stated, including six bearing chassis numbers 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359 and 2360
(Exhibit 2 P ) .
5. On each of the respective dates indicated above,
the two conditional sales agreements described in 1 and
2 were duly assigned by Mack Trucks, Inc. to Mack Financial Corporation of Oakland, California and Nevada
Truck Rentals, Inc. duly signed a vendee's receipt of
notice of such assignment (Exhibits 1 P, 2 P).
6. On January 23, 1968, and on February 15, 1968,
Plaintiff and Defendant Nevada Motor Rentals executed
extensions of conditional sales agreements relating to the
agreements described in 1 and 2 by which terms of payment were adjusted in accordance with the provisions
thereof, which in effect readjusted the finance charges
due and owing and increasing the amount of the monthly
payments due on each of the two conditional sales agreements (Exhibits 3 P, 4 P). None of the exhibits (1 P,
2 P, 3 P or 4 P) were executed in the State of Utah.
7. W. J. Digby as an individual signed an undated
contract of guaranty by which he agreed as guarantor
to absolutely and unconditionally guarantee the full,
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prompt and faithful payment of any and all indebtedness
of Nevada Motor Rentals to Mack Financial Corporation
and/or Mack Trucks, Inc. and his guaranty applied to
the conditional sales agreements (Exhibits 1 P, 2 P).
8. As of January 19, 1970, Nevada Motor Rentals
was delinquent in its monthly payments due Plaintiff
under the conditional sales agreements (R. 5).
9. Don Digby (Vice President of Nevada Motor
Rentals) talked to Roy Adams about an arrangement to
transfer the vehicles to Scott Trucking (R. 5). This conversation took place in Mack Financial's office and was
the only contact which Nevada Motor Rentals had in
the State of Utah (R. 5, R. 35).
10. Roy Adams called from Salt Lake City to Lee
Scott of Scott Trucking and confirmed that a transfer
agreement had been worked out (R. 5).
11. Seven transfer agreements were executed by
which it was agreed as to each of the seven vehicles whose
chassis numbers are set forth in 1 and 2 above that
Nevada Motor Rentals transferred and assigned to Scott
Trucking all of?Nevada's right, title and equity in and
to each of said seven vehicles (R. 5, R. 6). By such transfer agreements, Mack Financial Corporation consented
to such transfer upon the terms and conditions stated
in the agreements. Six of the contracts provided for the
payment to Plaintiff of $18,653.20 on each truck and the
seventh provided for a payment of $15,683.85 for a total
of $217,603.05, the amount of which represented the un-
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paid balance remaining due and owing to Plaintiff under
the conditional sales agreement described in 1 and 2
above, and the amount which Plaintiff sought to recover
from Defendants in its complaint (Exhibits 10 P through
16 P).
12. Roy Adams (for Mack Financial) flew to Boise
to have the transfer agreements executed by Lee Scott
of Scott Trucking and to Denver where they were executed by Jim Digby and Walter Klus for Nevada Motor
Rentals.
13. The transfer agreements were payable in Salt
Lake City, Utah (Exhibits 10 P through 16 P).
14. As to each of said transfer agreements, Lee Scott
individually signed a contract of guaranty identical in
terms to that signed by W. J. Digby as mentioned in
paragraph 7 above.
15. At the time of the execution of the seven transfer agreements on January 19, 1970, the seven vehicles
covered thereby were delivered to Scott Trucking and
taken to Boise, Idaho, from Denver, Colorado, where
they had been in the possession of Digby Truck Lines
under lease or rental from Nevada Motor Sales (R. 13).
16. Following transfer of the vehicles to Scott
Trucking that Company made one payment on each of
the trucks, totaling $3,246.09 (Exhibit 17 P and R. 37).
17. Thereafter, no further payments were made by
Scott Trucking and beginning on or about February 1,
1970, and in the ten days thereafter, each of the seven
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vehicles were driven to Denver, Colorado, by Scott Trucking drivers and were taken to the premises of Digby
Truck Lines and were then driven to the premises of
Mack Trucks, Inc. where they were left and where they
remained for approximately the next two years (R. 14,
R. 18, R. 139).
18. Plaintiff promptly learned of the return of the
trucks to Denver by Scott Trucking and of their location
at Mack Trucks, Inc. in Denver (R. 14, R. 38).
19. On June 11, 1970, Plaintiff filed its complaint
in this case (R. 240).
20. Mack Financial was advised that Nevada Motor
Rentals was having financial difficulties when the trucks
were returned (R. 16, R. 33).
21. Don Digby discussed selling the trucks with
Roy Adams and Roy Adams was also contacted by Collins of Mack Trucks and by Harold Olsen of Mack Trucks.
No method of disposing of the trucks was arranged (R.
16, R. 42).
22. The trucks were appraised for value by various
persons at different times as follows:
(a)
Value 1967
Date

Model

Value 1968
Models-each

By John C. Roddy, Employee Mack Trucks
(Wholesale)
Exhibit 19 D
4/3/70 $10,500.00 $11,500.00
Exhibit 20 P
12/10/70 $ 8,500.00 $ 9,800.00
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Also stated that wholesale is 20% less than
retail.)
(b)
By Don Digby, Vice
President, Nevada
Motor Rentals
About
(R. 142) (Retail) ...
4/10/70 $15,000.00 $16,000.00
(c)
John James Alward,
Truck Sales from J. T.
Jenkins, Kenworth
Dealer (Wholesale)
(R. 172, 173, 174)
lor2/70 $15,000.00 $16,000.00
(Also stated that as rule of thumb 25% off
for first year, 15% for second year and 10%
for each year thereafter.)
Lee Scott (R. 139, 132)
(Exhibits 10 P through
16 P)
1/70 $17,683.85 $20,653.20
(Sales price to Scott.)
23. The following persons sought to purchase one
or more of the vehicles during the period that they were
stored:
Charles W. Weart,
Employee of W. J. Digby
Hollis E. Rosch,
Employee of W. J. Digby
Russell B. Malcolm,
Employee of Rightway
Transportation
(Robert Digby)
24. The trucks were

4/70 Willing to pay $18,000.00
9/70 Willing to pay $16,000.00
or $17,000.00
6/70 Willing to pay $16,000.00
or $17,000.00
ultimately sold by Plaintiff on
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January 25, 1972 at public auction in Denver, Colorado,
as follows:
Purchaser

William Sharp
Brighton, Colorado
Wheeler Sales
Las Vegas, Nevada
J. K. Merrill & Sons
Pocatello, Idaho
Interstate Mack
Boise, Idaho

Chassis No.

Price

2358-1968

$ 6,900.00

2356-1968

6,000.00

2358 and 2360 12,900.00
(6,450.00 each)
1947-1967
18,900.00
(6,300.00 each)
2357-1968
2359-1968
$44,700.00

(Exhibit 17-P)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION
OVER DEFENDANT NEVADA MOTOR
RENTALS, AND THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT NEVADA MOTOR RENTAL'S DISMISSAL.
One of the puzzling features of this case has been
the selection of the State of Utah as the jurisdiction for
trial by the Plaintiff. It would seem that the State of
Utah would be the most inappropriate state in which the
action could be brought.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
Lee Scott of Scott Trucking had contact with Mack
Financial only by telephone, and Mack Financial's agent
Roy Adams carried the transfer agreements to Boise for
the signature of Lee Scott (R. 5). W. J. Digby, who
had signed the continuing guarantee had never had any
contact within the State of Utah and was subject only
to a telephone call from Mack Financial to his home in
Phoenix (R. 7). Nevada Motor Rentals could not be
found under any stretch of the imagination to be doing
business in the State of Utah with the exception of one
visit when Mr. Donald Digby, Vice President of Nevada
Motor Rentals appeared in Mack Financial office to
propose the transfer agreements with Scott Trucking (R.
5). Evidently, Mack Financial did not feel that Donald
Digby could sign for Nevada Motor Rentals, as Mack
Financial's agent, Roy Adams, carried the documents to
Denver for their signature and later acquired a Power
of Attorney from W. J. Digby authorizing the signature
of the documents for and on behalf of Nevada Motor
Rentals (R. 8).
The only contact with the State of Utah upon which
Plaintiff can rely for jurisdiction was the conversation of
Don Digby with Roy Adams of Mack Financial Corporation in Mack Financial's office in Salt Lake City (R. 5),
and at this time no actual business was performed. Documents were later prepared which were signed in Boise by
Lee Scott and in Denver for Nevada Motor Rentals.
Those documents designated Salt Lake City as a place

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
for performance. In this respect, they were equally as
binding on Scott Trucking as on Nevada Motor Rentals.
The Defendant Nevada Motor Rentals could not be
characterized as having done business within the State
of Utah unless the activities of Nevada Motor Rentals
fall within the limitations of Title 78-27-24, which reads
as follows:
78-27-24, Jurisdiction over nonresidents—
Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.—Any
p e r s o n , notwithstanding section 16 -10 -102,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who in person or through an agent does any of
the following enumerated acts, submits himself,
and if an individual, his personal representative,
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as
to any claim arising from:
(1) The transaction of any business within
this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods
in this state;
(3) The causing of any injury within this
state whether tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of
any real estate situated in this state;
(5) Contracting to insure any person,
property or risk located within this state at the
time of contracting.
(6) With respect to actions of divorce and
separate maintenance, the maintenance in this
state of a matrimonial domicile at the time the
claim arose or the commission in this state of
the act giving rise to the claim.
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In this case the contact between Nevada Motor Rentals and Mack Financial was one of a conversation in
an office. The question then arises whether this conversation constituted the transaction of business within the
State. If it was the transaction of business, the Defendant respectfully submits that such a conversation could
not be the transaction of business. The business actually
being transacted constituted the signing of the transfer
agreements which did not take place within the State

of Utah.
No case has been found in which a contact as slight
as that relied on in this case for "transaction of business"
as in this case. The rule is cited in Hill v. Zale Corporation, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2nd 332, in which the Court
states:
"The question is whether the corporation is
doing business within the state in a real and substantial sense."
Defendant Lee Scott, dba Scott Trucking and Nevada Motor Rentals should be subject to the same rule
of law. Whatever it is. The dismissal of the action as
against Lee Scott, dba Scott Trucking was prejudicial
to Nevada Motor Rentals, and the facts of jurisdiction
would appear to be the same.
Title 78-27-26 specifically limits the claims to those
claims arising out of the acts enumerated in 78-27-24.
78-27-26. Jurisdiction over nonresidents—Only
claims arising from enumerated acts may be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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asserted.—Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him
is based upon this act.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT NO DEFICIENCY BE ASSESSED
WHERE THE SALE OF SECURITY IS
FOUND TO BE "NOT COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE."
The Lower Court found that the sale of the trucks
was not a commercially reasonable disposition. It therefore follows:
1. The court has a choice under the Uniform Commercial Code as construed by the Courts of either:
(a) Denying a deficiency judgment altogether
and dismissing the action by entering a judgment for
the Defendant, or
(b) Presuming that the damages to be awarded
Defendant under 70A-9-507(l) are equal to the
amount of the deficiency.
The majority of courts have taken the view that the
failure to conduct a commercially reasonable disposition
deprives the debtor of any deficiency and ends the case.
The leading cases are: Braswell v. American National
Bank, 161 S. E. 2d 420 (Ga.); Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corporation v. Atlas Shirt Co,, Inc., Defen-
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dant, 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N. Y. S. 2d 13 (N. Y. 1971);
Sheets \. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation, 222 F.
Supp. 696 (W. Dist. Pa. 1963).
The viewpoint is supported by the fact that Section
70A-9-504 creates both the right to a deficiency, in 70A9-504(2), and the rules regarding the disposition that is
a condition precedent to a deficinecy, in 70A-9-504(3).
There obviously cannot be a deficiency until there has
been a disposition and if the disposition has not been
commercially reasonable than a deficiency has not been
properly established and the right to a deficiency necessarily dissolves.
The minority view awards damages to the debtor under Section 70A-9-507(l) which are presumed to be equal
to whatever deficiency could originally have been established. This view is evidenced by the Arkansas court in
Barker v. Horn, 432 S. W. 2d 21 (Ark.), Martin v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 398 S. W. 2d 538
(Ark. 1966). The Code provisions can be read to support
either viewpoint and the comments do not indicate the
correct choice. Certainly the majority view of denying
a deficiency gives full effect to the requirement of commercial reasonableness and its adoption by all courts
would tend to "shape up" creditors for everyone's benefit.
Certainly a creditor cannot complain if his exercise of the
required duty enhances the proceeds of the collateral.
Perhaps the real distinction between the two provisions can be learned from cases construing similar provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Section
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23 provided that where there is no resale the buyer is
discharged of all obligation under the contract, similar
to the election under 70A-9-505(2). Section 24 provided
that the buyer shall be liable for the contract price only
after a resale as in Section 70A-9-504(2). Section 25
provided that the buyer may recover his actual damage
if the seller fails to comply with the statutory requirements as to resale, and in no event less than one-fourth
of all payments made under the contract with interest,
as in Section 70A-9-507(l). The Conditional Sales Act,
as construed, and the Uniform Commercial Code are thus
parallel in appearing to provide two remedies to the
debtor — a denial of the deficiency judgment and a right
to damages which may be equal to the amount of the
original deficiency. The courts, however, did not have
the same difficulty in reconciling the two provisions as
shown by an analysis of two cases decided in the same
jurisdiction, Underwood v. Raleigh Transportation Equipment and Construction Company, 102 W. Va. 305, 135 S.
E. 4 (W. Va. 1926) and Commercial Investment Trust
v. Browning, 108 W. Va. 585, 152 S. E. 10 (W. Va. 1930).
Both cases are cited in 49 A. L. R. 2d, the current annotation on rights and duties of parties to conditional sales
contracts as to resale of repossessed property. Commercial Investment Trust, supra, is cited for the proposition
that the seller loses any claim to a recovery of the deficiency if he fails to properly carry out the resale under
Section 24. Underwood v. Raleigh Transportation Equipment and Construction Company, supra, is cited for the
proposition that the buyer may recover his actual dam-
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ages under Section 25 if the seller fails to comply with
the statutory requirements.
In Underwood v. Raleigh Transportation Equipment and Construction Company, supra, where
the defendant was the vendor under a conditional sales agreement and the plaintiff had defaulted after having paid $305 of a $600 contract, and where the plaintiff proved that the
defendant had resold the vehicle for $668, thereby establishing the amount by which he was
damaged, it was held that the defendant should
have accounted to the plaintiff for the price
obtained by it on resale of the automobile under Section 25 of the Act. There was, of course,
no requirement to give him the minimum provided by Section 25 since he had proved his
actual damages.
In Commercial Investment Trust v. Browning,
supra, where the plaintiff was a conditional vendor of a Nash automobile sold for $1,100 and
where the balance due at the time of repossession was approximately $200 but the plaintiff's
improper resale resulted in proceeds of $1, it
was held that the plaintiff's failure to conduct
the resale in accordance with the statute precluded a deficiency judgment.
The comparison of these cases decided by the same court
under provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
that are substantially the same in intent as the relevant
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code show the
correct interpretation of both statutes.
The damage provision of 70A-9-507(l) is to be ap-
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plied when the resale returns more to the secured party
than the balance that was due him under the secured
agreement from the debtor. The denial of a deficiency
judgment is to be applied when the sale is in some way
irregular and therefore commercially unreasonable and
the proceeds of the sale are therefore less than the deficiency due from the debtor. This reconciliation justifies
the majority view that has been taken in the construction
of the Uniform Commercial Code.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT NO DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT MAY
BE ASSESSED WHERE NOTICE OF SALE
IS ABSENT OR DEFICIENT.
Although the Court seems to have found that the
sale of the security by Plaintiff was not a "commercially
reasonable" sale, the same result could have been reached
for failure to give proper notice of the sale.
Plaintiff has failed to both plead and prove that it
sent notice required by 70A-9-504(3):
"Shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor
. . ." and in fact the record fails to disclose any attempt
to do so. Plaintiff contends that published notice (Exhibits 5 P and 6 P) satisfies the statute. On its face it
does not.
The burden of pleading and proving compliance with
the notice requirements of § 70A-9-504 is on the secured
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party. Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp.,
415 S. W. 2d 347 (Tenn. App. 1966); Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N. W. 474, 468 P. 2d 875 (1970);
Skeels v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696
(W. D. Pa. 1963), mod. other grds., 335 F. 2d 846 (3rd
Cir. 1,969).
The courts have consistently held that there must
be strict compliance with the notice requirements in
§ 70A-9-504(3); substantial compliance is insufficient.
For example, in Morris Plan Co. of Bettendorf v. Johnson, 271 N. E. 2d 404 (111. App. 1971), it was held that
a general notice that the collateral would be sold, without
specifying the time, date or place of the sale, was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 70A-9-504(3),
even where the secured party had notified the debtor of
its intention to effect a resale. The same result obtained
in BrasweU v. American National Bank, 117 Ga. App.
699, 161 S. E. 2d 420 (1968), where the secured party
notified the debtor that unless he paid off the balance
due, the collateral would be put up for bid and sold to
the highest bidder and the debtor would be responsible
for any deficiency. Similarly, in Charley v. Rico Motor
Co., 82 N. M. 244, 480 P. 2d 404 (1971) notice which
stated that the collateral would be sold, but which contained no information as to the time or place of the proposed sale, was deemed insufficient. Accord, Edmondson
v. Air Service Co., 123 Ga. App. 310, 180 S. E. 2d 589
(1971). See also, Moody v. Nides Finance Co., 115 Ga.
App. 859, 156 S. E. 2d 310 (1967).
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Claimant's Failure to Give Notice as Required by
the Uniform Commercial Code is an absolute Bar Against
a Deficiency Judgment both Under Applicable Case Law.
Where a secured party fails to give the notice required by 70A-9-504(3), he is not entitled to recover
from the debtor the difference between the amount remaining due on the contract and the proceeds of the sale.
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Atlas Switch
Co., Inc., 323 N. Y. S, 2d 13 (N. Y. Civ. App. 1971). The
rationale for this rule was well-articulated in Leasco,
where following repossession of the collateral, solicitation
of bids, and public sale of the equipment to the highest
bidder for an amount equal to the then fair market value,
the secured party sought a deficiency judgment for the
amount remaining due on the original contract, notwithstanding its failure to notify the defendant of the time
after which any private sale or other intended disposition
was to be made, "as explicitly required by UCC 70A-9504(3)" 323 N. Y. S. 2d at 14. The court rejected the
claim for a deficiency judgment, stating:
"It surely has meaning that the very section
(9-504) that affirms the right to a deficiency
judgment after sale of a repossessed article also
describes in simple and practical terms the rules
governing disposition as well as the pertinent
notice requirements. If a secured creditor's right
to a deficiency judgment were intended to be
independent of compliance with those rules, one
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would surely expect that unusual concept to be
delineated with clarity. The natural inference
that the right depends upon compliance is forcefully underlined by the joining of the two provisions in the one section." Id. at 16.
Characterizing as "tenuous" plaintiff's contention
that a secured creditor's right to a deficiency judgment
under the described circumstances was limited only by
the debtor's remedies set forth in 70A-9-507, the court
further reasoned:
"Preliminarily, it may be noted that 70A-9507 makes no direct allusion to the circumstances under which a right to a deficiency
judgment may arise.
"More significant is the special nature of
the language used: 'The Debtor or any person
entitled to notification . . . has a right to recover
from the secured party any loss caused by failure
to comply with the provisions of this part.' If
this were intended to authorize a defense to an
action for a deficiency judgment, it is hard to
imagine language less apt to that purpose . . .
[I]t is unlikely that the experienced authors of
the UCC intended by the above language to
provide a limited defense to an action for a deficiency judgment based on a sale that had violated the simple and flexible statutory procedure.
"It seems far more probable that this latter
section has nothing whatever to do with defenses to an action for a deficiency, since it was
never contemplated that a secured party would
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recover such a judgment after violating the statutory command as to notice," Id. at 16.
Beyond this, the court derived some measure of support for its holding from the position taken by the courts
with respect to similar provisions in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which as in the UCC did not specifically
link the right to secure a deficiency judgment with the
notice provisions but did specifically declare the debtor's
right to recover damages in the event of a violation of the
sections regulatting sale and notice of sale:
"Significantly, the principle became firmly
established . . . in virtually all states that adopted
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, that the
right of the conditional vendor to secure a deficiency judgment was dependent upon precise
compliance with the statutory requirements as
to notice [citations omitted]." Id. at 15.
The court added that if the authors of the UCC had desired to overthrow this firmly established and generally
accepted rule,
"they surely would have manifested that intent
in clear and unambiguory language . . . The
conclusion is inescapable that the prior interpretation continues to be applicable under the
UCC, and that the failure of this plaintiff to
follow the quiet modest notice requirements of
70A-9-504(3) defeats absolutely the claim herein
asserted." Id. at 15-16.
Finally the court explained that its conclusion —
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namely, that the right to a deficiency judgment depends
upon strict compliance with the statutory requirements
concerning dispositions of collateral and notice thereof
— did not impose an onerous burden on a secured creditor. Rather, it merely requires a secured creditor who
"wishes a deficiency judgment [to] obey the law, the
relevant provisions of which are now simpler and more
flexible than before. If he does not obey the law he may
not secure a deficiency judgment." Id. at 17.
Having failed to obey the law as to notice of sale,
Claimant has forfeited any right it may have had to a
deficiency judgment against the Debtor. For this Court
to rule otherwise would allow Claimant to escape the
provisions of the UOC in general, and its notice requirements in particular, and thereby "permit a continuation
of the evil, which the Commercial Code sought to correct." Skeels v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., supra,
222 F. Supp. 696 (W. D. Pa. 1963), mod. other grds.9 335
F. 2d 846 (3rd Oir. 1969).
The Skeels court added: "[I]t must be held that
a security holder who sells without notice may not look
to the debtor for any loss." 122 F. Supp. at 702.
POINT IV.
UNDER ANY VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
THE VALUES OF THE VEHICLES SHOULD
BE DETERMINED TO BE $15,000 FOR THE
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1967 VEHICLE AND $16,000 FOR THE 1969
VEHICLES.
A summary of the testimony with respect to values
of the vehicles is set out on page .... of the Statement of
Facts. Here it is sufficient to recite that on the 10th
day of January 1970, Lee Scott purchased the vehicles at
$17,683.85 for the 1967 vehicle and $23,653.20 for each
of the 1968 vehicles. The vehicles were then returned beginning on February 1, which was exactly twenty days
later. This fact argues strongly that the vehicles had a
value commensurate with that which was paid by Lee
Scott on January 10, 1970. Donald Digby gave the vehicles a value of $15,000.00 for the 1967 vehicle and $16,000.00 for the 1968 vehicles. He characterized this valuation as one of retail, indicating:
"Well, I have never had the occasion to total
wholesale equipment as was testified here yesterday by the Mack people. My figure is set on
a retail level; however, not the high level by any
means, because I did have the trucks sold in excess of $18,000.00 for Scott."
The vehicles were appraised by John James Alward,
wholesale, at $15,000 for the 1967 vehicle and $16,000 for
the 1968 vehicles. Alward also stated the formula by
which he arrived at his valuation and indicated that his
company was willing to hold their appraisal for six
months after an appraisal offer was given.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
More persuasive is the fact that three individuals
came forward and gave testimony, Charles B. Weart, that
he was willing to pay $18,000 for one of the vehicles;
Hollis E. Rosch, in September, 1970, was willing to pay
$16,000 or $17,000 for one of the vehicles; Russell B.
Malcolm indicated he was willing to pay $16,000 or $17,000 for one of the vehicles. In all cases, giving the benefit of the doubt to taking the least advantageous figure,
the evidence would indicate the values of $15,000 for the
1967 vehicle and $16,000 for the 1968 vehicles were not
unreasonable values. The testimonies of Charles B.
Weart, Hollis E. Rosch and Russell B. Malcolm stand
unopposed and unconverted in the record. It is also
worthy of note that the trial court did not accept the
low valuation given by John C. Roddy.
It is respectfully submitted that in the event any
deficiency is allowed, the basis for the finding of the
amount that the vehicles should have sold for on June
30, 1970, should be: $15,000 for the 1967 vehicle and
$16,000 for the 1968 vehicles.
Under either theory, (a) that no deficiency be allowed; or (b) that a proper valuation be allowed for each
of the vehicles (the return at the proper valuation would
have been $111,000.00) there should and would be no
deficiency assessed.
POINT V.
THE OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENSES OF $2,477.31 WERE DIRECTLY RELATED TO
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THE DELAY IN THE SALE AND IN THE
EVENT A DEFICIENCY IS ALLOWED,
THE OUT-OF-POCKET
EXPENSES
SHOULD NOT BE REIMBURSED TO THE
PLAINTIFF.
While it is conceivable that there could have been
some slight repairs and reconditioning services on the
seven trucks delivered to the Mack Truck lot around the
first of February, 1970, the record is void of any testimony concerning such reconditioning. What testimony
is in the record concerning the reconditioning clearly indicates that the reconditioning was related to the time
delay of two years in the determination to sell the vehicles. As such, the out-of-pocket expenses are clearly
colored with the fact that the sale was not a commercially reasonable sale and should not be allowed.
POINT VI.
THE COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY CALCULATED THE INTEREST IN SUCH A
FASHION THAT THE DEFENDANT IS
FORCED TO PAY INTEREST ON PRINCIPAL WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID
ON JUNE 30, 1970, HAD THE SALE BEEN
CONDUCTED IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER.
The Plaintiff has calculated his judgment as set out
in paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18, in the Findings of Fact:
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No.

G181
G181
G181
G181
G181
G181
G181

7778-1
7778-2
7778-3
7778-4
7778-5
7778-6
7778-7

Chassis No.

FL773LST
FL773LST
FL773LST
FL773LST
FL773LST
FL773LST
FL773LST

Pay-off as of
April 15.1970

1947
2355
2356
2357
2358
2359
2360

$ 13,518.51
16,025.91
16,025.91
16,025.91
16,025.91
16,025.91
16,025.91
109,673.97

Plus 2Y2 months interest to June 30, 1970 at
10.5%

2,399.11

TOTAL INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL
TO 6/30/70
112,073.08
Less Proceeds of sale
44,700.00
67,373.08
Less $40,750 (additional amount which
vehicles would have sold for on June
30, 1970
40,750.00

Plus out-of-pocket expenses

26,623.08
2,477.31
29,100.39

Plus interest on $26,623.08 to June 10,
1972, at 10.5%
Plus interest on $29,100.39 from June 10,
1972, through May 31, 1973
TOTAL JUDGMENT

5,590.84
3,055.53
$ 37,746.76
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CONCLUSION
The method by which the Court has entered the
amount of judgment would require the defendant to pay
interest on the sums which were not paid as a result of
the commercially unreasonable delay in sale, and in effect
would be charging the Defendant interest on the Plaintiff's failure to timely credit the account.
The foregoing is respectfully submitted.
LORIN N. PACE
431 South Third East, B-l
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ROBERT DIGBY
217 Luhrs Tower
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Attorneys for
Defendant-Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY.
DEC 9

1975

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

J. Reuben Clark Law School

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

